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To determine the epidemiology of outbreaks of avian 
inﬂ   uenza A virus (subtypes H5N1, H9N2) in chickens in 
Bangladesh, we conducted surveys and examined virus 
isolates. The outbreak began in backyard chickens. Prob-
able sources of infection included egg trays and vehicles 
from local live bird markets and larger live bird markets.
T
he threat that highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (HPAI) 
A virus subtype H5N1 poses to poultry and public 
health has intensiﬁ  ed (1). As the virus becomes established 
in poultry in developing countries, the number of human 
cases increases (1,2). Countries in the Asian Association 
for Regional Co-operation are especially vulnerable to vi-
rus perpetuation because of insufﬁ  cient biosecurity, rearing 
of chickens and ducks together, selling of live birds, and 
deﬁ  cient disease surveillance. To prevent human infection 
with avian inﬂ  uenza (H5N1), knowledge of avian inﬂ  uenza 
epidemiology is needed. We therefore describe the epide-
miology of HPAI outbreaks in chickens in Bangladesh.
The Study
Through July 10, 2007, we investigated 52 outbreaks 
caused by HPAI virus (H5N1) and 3 outbreaks caused by 
low-pathogenicity avian inﬂ  uenza (LPAI) virus (H9N2) in 
chickens in Bangladesh.  After a high number of chicken 
deaths on a farm was reported to an upazila (a lower admin-
istrative unit of Bangladesh) veterinarian, the sick chickens 
on the farm were examined. From each of 55 outbreaks, 
2 dead chickens were sent to a ﬁ  eld disease investigation 
laboratory or to the Central Disease Investigation Labora-
tory, where oropharyngeal swabs were tested for avian in-
ﬂ  uenza A virus antigen. From cases with positive results, 
tracheal samples were referred to the National Reference 
Laboratory for Avian Inﬂ  uenza (NRL-AI) for viral RNA 
extraction and puriﬁ  cation (3), reverse transcription–PCR 
that used a primer set of hemagglutinin (H) genes (4), and 
end-product visualization. When NRL-AI conﬁ  rmed H5, 
the farm was considered HPAI affected and was reported 
to the Department of Livestock Services. Tracheal samples 
from chickens involved in 37 outbreaks, including those 
that were A-antigen positive but H5 negative, were sent to 
the Veterinary Laboratory Agency in the United Kingdom 
for conﬁ  rmation. A farm on which inﬂ  uenza subtype H9N2 
was found was considered LPAI affected. All farms affect-
ed with HPAI or LPAI virus were called avian inﬂ  uenza–
affected farms. A district or upazila with at least 1 avian 
inﬂ  uenza–affected farm was considered an infected district 
or infected upazila.
To collect information about the farms, we used a pre-
tested questionnaire administered by 2 veterinarians. The 
form had space where veterinarians could add additional 
comments on the probable virus sources for infections by 
backward tracing (window <21 days of onset of clinical 
signs) and sources of spread by forward tracing (window 
between onset of clinical signs and culling), which they 
obtained by interviewing the affected farmers and allied 
personnel. Farm geographic coordinates were recorded. 
Through another questionnaire, we collected data on com-
mercial and backyard farms and outbreaks from the upazila 
livestock ofﬁ  ces. All avian inﬂ  uenza data stored at the De-
partment of Livestock Services head ofﬁ  ce, ﬁ  eld disease in-
vestigation laboratories, the Central Disease Investigation 
Laboratory, and NRL-AI were also collected.
Summary statistics were computed and plotted by us-
ing Excel (Microsoft, Redmond, WA, USA), Arc View 9.1 
(Environmental Systems Research Institute, Redlands, CA, 
USA), and STATA 7 (Stata Corp., College Station, TX, 
USA). A 7-day rolling mean of avian inﬂ  uenza–affected 
farms, according to date of clinical onset of disease, was 
calculated from January 12, 2007, and plotted as a bar chart 
on day 4 for each value. Attack rates of farms were cal-
culated separately for upazilas of every infected district 
(Table 1).
We found that the H cleavage site of the selected in-
ﬂ  uenza subtype H5N1 isolates (determined from the Vet-
erinary Laboratory Agency) contained polybasic amino 
acids, which are characteristic of HPAI A viruses (Table 
2). According to categories established by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (5), 5 breeder and 2 layer farms 
had production system 2, 28 layer farms and 1 broiler farm 
had system 3, and 20 backyard farms had system 4. The 
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fected farms are shown in Figure 1; the temporal and spa-
tial spreads, in Figure 2. The index farm was recorded on 
January 15, 2007, at a local live bird market in Sarishabari 
upazila in Jamalpur district. We hypothesized that the in-
fection probably came from chickens in nearby backyard 
farms because high numbers of deaths in this population 
went uninvestigated.
The outbreaks peaked on March 26, 2007, when 11 af-
fected farms in 3 districts—Dhaka, Gazipur, and Narayan-
gogj—formed a cluster, indicating a common source. The 
source may have been larger live bird markets, which prob-
ably infected chickens of the 15 districts. The ﬁ  rst avian 
inﬂ  uenza–affected backyard farm was reported on March 
22, 2007, the date when avian inﬂ  uenza was conﬁ  rmed in 
Bangladesh. Of the 20 backyard farms, 14 were in 7 north-
ern districts.
The overall attack rates for the upazilas of the infected 
districts were 6/1,000 commercial farms and 1/100,000 
backyard farms (Table 1). Uninvestigated deaths of back-
yard chickens could result in underestimation of the attack 
rate.
Among the 9 probable sources of infection, egg trays 
and contaminated vehicles from larger live bird markets 
and local live bird markets accounted for 47% of probable 
virus sources, eggs for 48%, and apparently healthy chick-
ens for 5%. One avian inﬂ  uenza–affected farm disposed of 
≈1,000 dead chickens in an open ﬁ  eld before diagnosis was 
conﬁ  rmed. For the backyard chickens, sources of spread 
were selling chickens (5%), giving chickens to relatives or 
neighbors (15%), moving birds through local poultry ven-
dors, and hiding birds during culling operations (10%).
On the index farm, chickens in 1 shed were infected, 
but chickens in 2 other sheds <40 yards away remained 
clinically unaffected through the time of culling (71 days 
after clinical onset). Although the media reported that a 
corporate-run poultry farm, Biman Poultry Complex, was 
the ﬁ  rst avian inﬂ  uenza–affected farm in Bangladesh, our 
investigation found it to be the third. Of the 5 breeder farms, 
2 had imported chicks from the United States and 1 from 
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Table 1. Attack rates (infected upazila[s] for the infected districts) of avian influenza outbreaks in Bangladesh, 17/64 districts, January–
July 2007 
No. farms, infected/total*  Attack rate (95% CI)† 
District  Commercial Backyard  Commercial  Backyard 
Dhaka 14/744 0/0 0.019 (0.027–0.009) 
Dinajpur 0/29 1/124,872 0.000008 (0.000018–0.000002) 
Gaibandha 1/69 0/52,950 0.014 (0.041–0.009) NA
Gazipur 3/1,956 0/0 0.001 (0.0032–0.0002) NA
Jamalpur 5/144 0/58,962 0.034 (0.063–0.005) NA
Jessore 2/298 3/331,295 0.006 (0.014–0.002) 0.000003 (0.000008–0.000002) 
Joypurhat 0/124 1/101,152 NA 0.000009 (0.000027–0.00009) 
Lalmonirhat 0/85 2/76,582 NA 0.00002 (0.00005–0.00001) 
Magura 0/82 1/83,607 NA 0.00001 (0.00003–0.00001) 
Naogaon 0/109 2/80,752 NA 0.00002 (0.00005–0.00001) 
Narayangonj 7/925 0/0 0.007 (0.012–0.002)  NA
Nilphamari 0/119 5/277,984 NA 0.00001 (0.00003–0.00001) 
Noakhali 1/97 0/0 0.010 (0.029–0.009) NA
Rajbari 1/395 2/311,279 0.002 (0.006–0.002)  0.00006 (0.000014–0.000002) 
Rangpur 0/95 2/143,263 NA 0.00001 (0.00003–0.00001) 
Tangail 1/227 0/91,650 0.004 (0.012–0.004) NA
Thakurgaon 0/1,137 1/73,391 – 0.00001 (0.00003–0.00001) 
Total 35/5,635 20/1,807,739 0.006 (0.008–0.004)  0.00001 (0.000014–0.000006) 
*Infected, avian influenza–infected farms; total, farms in the infected upazila(s) of a district. 
†CI, confidence interval; NA, not applicable. 
Table 2. Samples sent to the Veterinary Laboratory Agency, UK, during outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza, Bangladesh,
2007*
Influenza virus subtype, no. positive 
Month† No. samples sent  H5N1 H9N2 Hemagglutinin cleavage site motif 
Jan 0 NA NA NA
Feb 0 NA NA NA
Mar 0 NA NA NA
Apr 13 12 1 PQGERRRKKRGLF 
May 10 9 1 PQGERRRKKRGLF 
Jun 8 6 1 PQGERRRKKRGLF 
Jul 6 5 NA NA
Total 37 32 3 NA
*NA, not applicable. 
†Month when the first clinical outbreak was reported. Avian Inﬂ  uenza Outbreaks in Chickens, Bangladesh
the United States and France, but these chicks had arrived 
>21 days before clinical onset of HPAI.
On May 22, 2008, the Directorate General of Heath 
Services, Bangladesh, declared that a sample collected 
from a child in January 2008 was diagnosed by the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as positive for 
inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1). Before this time, no human infec-
tion with inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) had been reported in Ban-
gladesh. Lack of human cases may have resulted from early 
immunologic response (6,7), genetic variation in receptors 
(8–10), poor surveillance of disease in humans, or using 
antiviral drugs during culling of birds.
Conclusions
Our investigation showed that the epicenter of the 
HPAI outbreaks in Bangladesh was the Sarishabari upazi-
la of Jamalpur district and that the primary source of in-
fection was backyard chickens. Phylogenetic analysis on 
1 inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) isolate showed that it belongs to 
the subclade 2.2 of the Qinghai lineage (11), most closely 
related to viruses isolated from Afghanistan, Mongolia, 
and Russia (11). Therefore, the virus might have entered 
Bangladesh through migratory birds (12–14). The pres-
ence of inﬂ  uenza virus subtype H9N2 in chickens on 3 
farms, however, raises the question of when this virus 
was introduced to Bangladesh. An earlier introduction or 
emergence of LPAI virus (H9N2) in backyard chickens 
cannot be ruled out because ≈18% of backyard chickens 
tested during 2000–2003 were seropositive for avian in-
ﬂ  uenza virus (15).
This study illustrates the progression of HPAI in Ban-
gladesh. Further study is needed to provided more evidence 
for the sources we have identiﬁ  ed. 
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Figure 1. Seven-day rolling mean of occurrence of avian inﬂ  uenza–
affected farms in outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza, 
Bangladesh, January–July, 2007. 
Figure 2. Monthly spread of highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza (HPAI) outbreaks in chickens, Bangladesh, January–July, 2007. Acknowledgments
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